Nelsen brngs to the debate some nuanced ponts. Although he accepts that there are sgnficant methodologcal dspartes, Nelsen argues that Rorty's pragmatsm can nevertheless advance our understandng of how questons about justce -especally lberal justce -can be addressed n a way that s genunely practcal and non-metaphyscal. Nelsen argues that Rawls seeks a justficaton of lberal justce that coheres wth basc premses of lberalsm (such as the commtment to accommodate value pluralty). But, for Nelsen, ths would be a matter of debate at a roundtable of lberal phlosophers already commtted to these basc premses and seekng to develop the most plausble way of constructng a theory of justce given these premses. Rortan pragmatsm, argues Nelsen, can provde a bass for a dfferent knd of defence: a world-savvy case for lberalsm capable of reachng an audence of non-lberals who reman unmoved by lberalsm's core prncples.
4 I wll assess the plausblty of ths proposal.
II. A qUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION
Probably one of the most pressng challenges we humans face s how to govern ourselves, not just as ndvduals (although that, too) but as collectves. How can the legal, economc, and poltcal nsttutons of socety be organzed n a way that s not merely efficent but also just? In addressng ths ssue, one possble approach s to start by dentfyng what s worthwhle n human lfe. One could, for example, begn wth what s requred for human flourshng or for the sort of lfe that s worth lvng. Then, based on what t takes to acheve ths good lfe, one could make recommendatons on how publc nsttutons should be organzed, and what government ought to provde to facltate the achevement of the good lfe for ts ctzens. One could then artculate the sort of responsbltes that fall on ctzens for servng ths project and how these responsbltes are to be dstrbuted farly amongst the ctzens.
Unfortunately The pluralty of these vews n socety, generally referred to as value pluralism, s an emprcal fact that Rawls takes as a gven. Rawls, as s well known, s nterested n dentfyng the prncples of justce to govern the structure of socety. Recognzng the exstence of value pluralsm n modern socetes, he mantans that t s msguded to try to settle metaphyscal questons for the purposes of dentfyng the requrements of justce. Prncples of justce, for Rawls, must be derved from somethng other than a metaphyscal vew of the good. I wll refer to ths feature as "the avodance of metaphyscs." Thus, Rawls's nqury about justce s a qualfied one: what would make nsttutons just, gven the realty of value pluralsm (and the dfficultes nvolved n settlng metaphyscal questons)? Are there prncples of justce not based on a partcular metaphyscal theory, whch a fashon-conscous scuba dver, an athest neurosurgeon, and a relgous conservatve (and many more complex combnatons) can all agree to, despte ther dfferent conceptons of a good lfe?
Gven ths framework of nqury, three ponts about Rawlsan theory deserve our attenton. Frst, Rawls's nterest n justce s a practcal one. For Rawls, justce s not an abstract concept to be clarfied through purely theoretcal thnkng. It s a practcal queston that should be dealt wth n relaton to specfic crcumstances and emprcal realtes of a gven place and tme. Thus, when Rawls says that he consders justce only as a "vrtue of nsttutons," he s hghlghtng ths practcal atttude.
7 For Rawls, justce s best understood as a feature of nsttutons rather than an abstract concept. Value pluralsm descrbed above s one such emprcal realty to be taken serously.
Second, Rawlsan theory comprses two levels of justficaton: () the justfi-caton of the avodance of metaphyscs and () the justficaton of any specfic prncple of justce that may follow once the ratonale for the avodance s accepted. The former has prorty over the latter, n that the constructon of lberal prncples of justce presupposes an avodance of partcular conceptons of the good. Gven ths prorty, I wll refer to the commtment to avod metaphyscal speculatons about the good as the "core commtment of lberalsm." 8 For Rawls, to the extent that Rawlsan lberalsm s a moral theory, ths core commtment must tself be motvated by a moral ratonale or a sense of justce.
9 However, the justficaton of ths core commtment s not well developed by Rawls. He s more nterested n developng the prncples of justce that ought to follow once the core commtment s accepted.
10 I wll return to ths pont later. Thrd, both hs practcal atttude toward justce and hs wllngness to avod metaphyscal debates ncte Rawls to confront a whole range of questons about method. To dentfy prncples of justce n a way that avods metaphyscal questons, Rawls develops a method he calls wde reflectve equlbrum [WRE].
11
Ths s a coherence-based method of devsng prncples of justce. Ths method follows a process n whch we start from basc ntutons and wegh them aganst prncples of justce and relevant emprcal nformaton, revsng each along the way untl a pont of equlbrum s reached. 12 In ths paper, I wll not be concerned wth the specfics of ths method, but wth the dea behnd t. Thus, references to WRE wll mply the broad methodologcal framework where a coherence-based method prevals over methods that seek to establsh justce on metaphyscal theores about the good. I wll refer to ths general framework as "Rawlsan constructvsm." (1) that poltcal socety s artfical, (2) that the ndvdual s the locus of value, and (3) the recognton that ndvduals dffer n ther "values, purposes, ends, nterests, commtments, and goals." My account of lberalsm's core commtment s lmted to (3) and therefore s a mnmal one. To nclude (1) and (2) would commt one to an account of lberalsm as a substantve normatve theory, whch Dmock acknowledges, at 203. Ths s so because these two clams are substantve clams. Although I recognze that lberalsm can be formulated as a substantve normatve theory, t can also be a non-substantve theory (and ths s what Rawls s seekng to acheve). I wll not, n ths paper, dscuss whch of the two mght be preferable, but merely dscuss the justficatory questons that arse from a more mnmalst and non-substantve concepton of lberalsm.
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III. NIElsEN oN WIDE REflEctIVE EqUIlIbRIUM
In recent years, Nelsen has advanced the thess that Rawlsan constructvsm s compatble wth Rorty's general vews about phlosophy. Ths proposal faces the obvous objecton that Rorty's vews about phlosophy are fundamentally ncompatble wth Rawls's vews about method.
13 But Nelsen holds a nuanced poston on Rorty's pragmatsm, and has recently offered an nterestng response to ths objecton. In order to assess hs response, let us brefly examne the debate over Rorty n the context of Rawlsan lberalsm.
As s well-known, Rorty has long held the vew that there s no unversal and objectve truth, and that truth clams can only be contextual.
14 Tradtonally, clams Rorty, phlosophy conssted of seekng objectve and unversal truth above hstorcal and contextual partculartes. Plato nvented phlosophy, Rorty wrtes n a recent artcle, "by postulatng the exstence of unchangng deas."
15
For Rorty, ths tradtonal vew of phlosophy has mplcatons for moral theory, for the assumpton that there must be an absolute truth to be unveled through the works of reason s taken to ental the clam that there must also be absolute values. 16 Once revealed, these absolute values can provde moral gudance to people on how to arrange ther lves and ther nsttutons. But, says Rorty, there s no such thng as unchangng moral "essences" to be grasped, but "only new ways of descrbng ourselves and the unverse."
17 For Rorty, ths does not undermne moral progress, but redefines t: progress does not nvolve graspng what s rght or wrong n lght of absolute values, and nstead occurs because people become aware of alternatves. Wth alternatves at hand, they can magne a better world. 18 Nelsen, who s nterested n Rawlsan constructvsm, has reasons to find Rorty's vews congenal. I have started by sketchng the basc components of Rawlsan constructvsm, and dentfied a rejecton of metaphyscs and a concern for practcal questons as beng two such basc components. Rorty seems to have, at least on the surface, these two ponts n common wth Rawls. Frst, Rorty re- Ths bears resemblance wth Rawls's vew that there s no sngle true concepton of the good and that t would be msguded to try to dentfy the requrements of justce by engagng n metaphyscal speculatons about the good. Lke Rawls, Rorty emphaszes the mportance of turnng "away from metaphyscs n favor of poltcs." 20 For Rorty, metaphyscs s also not relevant to appled ethcs. 21 Moral phlosophy that does not bear on questons about whether and how to change our poltcal and socal nsttutons s pontless.
22 Agan, these statements have a rng of famlarty. Recall that for Rawls the requrements of justce must be constructed on a poltcal (not metaphyscal) bass, n relaton to concrete poltcal and socal nsttutons.
Stll, many wll reman unmoved by Nelsen's clam that there exsts a commonalty between Rorty and Rawls, qualfyng ths seemng resemblance as beng merely superfical. Ths s because there are sgnficant dfferences that cannot be overlooked. Although he rejects the dea of phlosophy as the search for metaphyscal truth, Rawls s nterested n developng a theory of justficaton, as outlned above. By contrast, Rorty adamantly rejects any such endeavour. For Rorty, rejectng metaphyscs and embracng a contextualst vew should also ental rejectng a theory of justficaton. Thus, for Rorty, phlosophy cannot have a justficatory role.
Strpped of any justficatory role, there reman only two thngs phlosophy can do. One s to engage n some form of Wttgenstenan therapy, showng other (yet unaware) phlosophers that the tradtonal ways of searchng for the truth present a futle endeavour. Phlosophy, just lke therapy, can only be used for dagnosng malfuncton and helpng to overcome t. But ths s a self-referental use of phlosophy. What should those who genunely want to look for ways of mprovng the world do? For Rorty, there s a second opton avalable to phlosophers. They must gve up tryng to dentfy what s rght or wrong by seekng a tmeless moral truth; they must nstead look for ways of mprovng the world by usng magnaton and narratves. The problem wth ths endeavour, however, s that t collapses wth other dscplnes (especally narratve-based ones, such as hstory, lterature, and journalsm). What s to dfferentate phlosophy from those dscplnes? For Rorty, there s no dfferentaton. Phlosophy, then, presents no specal skll (perhaps other than the aforementoned Wttgenstenan therapy). Anyone nterested n mprovng the world, Rorty concedes, can
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Travelling Philosophically Light 259 engage n debates on how to make t happen. All one needs, wrtes Rorty, s "a journalst's nose for a good story, and a novelst's talent at spnnng t." 23 Rawls, of course, never reaches ths poston about method. For Rawls, the removal of metaphyscs must gve rse to a theory of justficaton. And that theory, n hs vew, s Kantan constructvsm n ethcs. Rawls s of the vew that, f adequately developed, ths method of justficaton can be a useful tool to make plausble recommendatons for legal, economc, and poltcal organzaton of socety, wth a genunely practcal promse and no metaphyscal baggage. But t s nonetheless a specfic method, whose refinement, for Rawls, s tself a phlosophcal project. In sum, although they both have smlar startng ponts, Rawls and Rorty seem to move n altogether dfferent drectons.
Nelsen s aware of these dspartes. But, aganst hs crtcs, Nelsen mantans that Rorty's vews can nevertheless provde a productve perspectve n refinng Rawls's vews on method. Nelsen ponts out that WRE s not a monolthc method, but has multple uses. He then clams that Rorty's pragmatsm s compatble wth at least one of them.
IV. INTERNAL AND ExTERNAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF LIBERAL JUSTICE
What are the multple uses of WRE? In hs recent paper publshed n ths Yearbook, 24 Nelsen dstngushes between nternal and external justficatons of prncples of lberal justce and states that WRE can be used at both levels of justficaton. He then clarfies that Rawls s nterested n formulatng an internal justficaton of lberal prncples. Hs goal, Nelsen tells us, s to show that poltcal lberalsm "hangs together," and that t s a consstent and coherent vew of justce.
25 But whether t hangs together s a separate queston from whether or not t s a plausble framework to thnk about socal justce n the first place. In other words, the queston of coherence concerns those who have already accepted the general framework of lberal justce and who look for the best way of constructng a lberal theory. Havng already accepted the core commtment of lberalsm, they want to see whch formulaton of lberal theory s most coherent. Ths type of nvestgaton s internal n that t appeals to an audence of those who are moved by lberalsm's core commtment.
But there s a second, external, audence consstng of those who do not accept the core commtment of lberal theory. Some, for example, are suspcous of the commtment to accommodate value pluralsm on the bass that such accommodaton promotes substantve lberal values, such as the prmacy of ndvdual lberty. 26 To llustrate, let us suppose, as Nelsen does, an external objector who 23 Ibid. at 378. 24 Nelsen, "Wde Reflectve Equlbra", supra note 3. 25 Ibid. 26 Varous categores of non-lberals can be dentfied. Susan Dmock n supra note 8 at 203, defines two well-known categores as follows: (1) communtarans, who "deny that ndvduals are the sole locus of value" and (2) conservatves, who "deny that ndvduals are the sole locus of value and that value s ultmately determned by the commtments of ndvduals as they see them." These categores are not clear-cut. Varatons can be provded and n some cases they can also holds non-lberal and conservatve values. Let us refer to ths hypothetcal objector as 'Nelsen's conservatve sceptc' 27 and assume that he opposes substantve lberal values, such as ndvdual lberty, on grounds that he finds them offensve. He finds them to be, say, corruptng. On the bass that he rejects these substantve lberal values, he rejects proposals of lberal justce. Instead, he wants to lve hs lfe by findng satsfacton and pleasure n herarchcal famly structures and communty values, where the communty as a whole s vewed as a locus of agent-neutral values.
Can a justficaton of lberal justce be provded to an external audence, such as ths conservatve sceptc? Nelsen mantans that Rorty's pragmatsm s promsng for such external justficaton. In order to see how ths can be acheved, Nelsen prescrbes a nuanced readng of Rorty's pragmatsm. Although Rorty mantans that phlosophy can have no justficatory role, argues Nelsen, t does not follow that no justficaton can be provded. What Rorty rejects s the vew that such justficaton s the outcome of a grand theory about truth and moralty. In contrast, he accepts that t should be possble to provde a justficaton, but ths justficaton has to be a pragmatc one.
28
V. CAN NIELSEN hAVE hIS RAWLS AND RORTY TOO?
Wth ths n mnd, Nelsen argues that, f equpped wth Rorty's pragmatsm, lberalsm can be defended aganst an external audence whle acknowledgng that there s no "perspectve-less" ahstorcal standpont. 29 Lberal theorsts, such as Rawls, are keen on a neutral justficaton of lberalsm. To external crtcs, rather than beng genunely neutral, such a justficaton ntroduces substantve lberal values (such as ndvdualsm or ndvdual freedom). For these crtcs, under the guse of lberal neutralty, these substantve lberal values are mposed on people who do not share them. By contrast, n a Rorty-style defence, t would be openly recognzed that the justficaton of lberalsm comes from a partcular standpont. That standpont, t wll also be recognzed, would not mply any clam of epstemologcal superorty over other standponts. It would have no clam of absolute truth or knowledge of the truth. It would also have no clam of neutralty n assessng the vrtues of lberalsm aganst other non-lberal proposals to organze socal nsttutons.
Rorty's vews on neutralty should not be read as a form of sceptcsm or nhloverlap. However, for the purposes of ths dscusson, ths account provdes a rough and ready account of possble devatons from lberalsm. 27 Here, 'sceptc' s meant as expressng sceptcsm of substantve lberal values. 28 Ths s consstent wth Rorty's dstncton between Phlosophy and phlosophy, whch Nelsen also follows. In ts 'bg-p sense', "Phlosophy" s an endeavour to uncover the nature of certan normatve concepts, such as justce. See Nelsen, "Reply to Rchard Rorty", supra note 1 at 132. By contrast, n ts"lttle-p"sense, "phlosophy" s a quest pursued by appealng as much as possble to concepts that are free-standng. For Rorty and Nelsen, the latter represents pragmatsm. In ths sense, phlosophy can stll provde justficaton on a gven queston, but t cannot have an overrdng "justficatory role," because t does not offer a theory of justficaton. See Nelsen, "Reply to Rchard Rorty" & Nelsen, "Reply to Idl Boran", supra note 1. 29 Nelsen, "Wde Reflectve Equlbra", supra note 3.
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Travelling Philosophically Light 261 sm, but rather as a partcular approach to justficaton. What s dstnctve about ths approach s that contested phlosophcal clams (presumably about truth and knowledge) can be ncluded n the reasonng. The reasonng would be pragmatc and would not requre a theory of justficaton. Instead, magnaton and narratve can be used to show how lberalsm may present alternatve vsons of socal order. It may then be possble to show that a lberal concepton of justce would make the world a better place.
There s, however, somethng puzzlng about the suggeston to use contested phlosophcal clams n the context of Rorty's express pragmatsm. Many contested phlosophcal clams are clams about truth, sometmes absolute truth. If Rorty's pragmatsm ends up allowng these clams, then t wll defeat ts own purpose. For Rorty's man pont s that there s no such thng as detached, objectve truth. If ths s so, why engage n a debate by ntroducng such phlosophcal notons?
A reader sympathetc to Rorty mght pont out, however, that ths objecton rests on a msreadng of Rorty's pragmatsm. For Rorty, such an objector would clarfy, there s no one absolute truth that has prmacy over others. Thus, no specal "vantage pont" wth specal epstemc advantage avalable to assess truth clams. But ths need not mean, Rorty's defender would add, that truth clams cannot be made or be used n dscussons. We can use those clams n debates, but we must also concede that they have no specal status over other clams. And we must also concede that there s no neutral way of assessng them.
But ths reply, unfortunately, opens up further troubles. If there s no way of assessng dfferent clams, then how do we know that new proposals present better alternatves? For even f a dfferent world can be magned, the process of magnaton tself does not tell us why the magned alternatve s better than the exstng stuaton. How can you tell, for example, that an magned world would not turn out worse? How can you tell that t wll present a better alternatve? The only way to tell s to assess the proposed alternatve n relaton to a standard. 30 An evaluaton n relaton to such a standard wll tell us whether the alternatve s better or worse, or whether t consttutes moral progress. Imagnaton wthout standards would generate empty statements at best. Any dscusson would then quckly turn nto a seres of clams wth each party nsstng that ther vew s the rght vew to hold, and ther alternatve s the better alternatve, wth lttle hope of reachng a meanngful agreement. Rorty's pragmatsm, then, as attractve as t may be at first blush, s of lttle help for an external justficaton of lberalsm's core commtment. But s Rawlsan constructvsm as nadequate as Nelsen suggests? Nelsen turns to Rorty's pragmatsm wthout explorng whether Rawlsan constructvsm presents any such possbltes. Rawls hmself does not offer a lengthy defence of lberalsm for an external audence. But such a lack, I beleve, can be remeded. In the followng and final secton, I wsh to gve some evdence for such possblty.
30 In Rorty, "Phlosophy Relevant to Appled Ethcs", supra note 14, Rorty refers to awareness of alternatves consttutng progress because beng aware of more alternatves makes us "wser." He seems to treat ths wsdom ganed from awareness of alternatves as provdng an evaluatve bass. But ths only makes sense as an evaluatve bass f t s construed as beng grounded n some sort of theoretcal value or standard. Thanks to Adam Rawlngs for nsghts on ths pont.
VI. LIBERALISM WIThOUT METAphYSICS
Rawls's vews on method are based on Kantan constructvsm 31 n moral theory. Ths method conssts n relatng a partcular concepton of the person to prncples of justce. Kantan constructvsm, to be plausble, must work wth a plausble concepton of the person. But note that such a concepton would not be an unrevsable one. A concepton of the person s an emprcal component of Kantan constructvsm. It must, therefore, be revsable n lght of new nformaton. If new evdence showed that humans were consttuted dfferently, then Kantan constructvsm would have to take t serously and modfy ts clams accordngly.
Such a useful account of the person has been offered by Davd Gauther n hs later wrtngs.
32 Human bengs, Gauther wrtes, share the capacty for a rch varety of ntentonal states as well as a lngustc capacty enablng them to represent these ntentonal states. The lngustc capacty allows people to nclude ther ntentonal states among ther objects of awareness, enablng them also to be aware of themselves as experencng and actng subjects. Gauther refers to ths capacty as a sense of "nner space."
33 Possessng such a space, the ndvdual can "dstngush and defend her belefs, concerns, and atttudes n the face of qute dfferent and even opposed belefs, concerns, and atttudes that she ascrbes to others." 34 I wll refer to ths feature smply as 'nternal awareness.' Assumng that nternal awareness s a plausble clam about humans, t can be used to shed lght on the ssue at hand. We can see those who reject substantve lberal values (such as ndvdual freedom) as formng ther rejecton through an nternal awareness of the belefs, concerns, and atttudes they hold, gvng rse to a vson of the sort of lfe they vew as worthwhle. Ths awareness allows them to dfferentate ther belefs, concerns, and atttudes from those held by others who do not share them. Possessng such a capacty, Nelsen's conservatve sceptc wshes to pursue hs lfe plans accordng to the belefs and concerns that consttute hs nner space.
An external justficaton of lberal nsttutonal practces can also start from ths capacty. To the extent that lberal nsttutons are put n place n recognton of ths nner space, Nelsen's conservatve sceptc can also recognze that he can pursue the sort of lfe he deems as the most worthwhle under lberal nsttutons. 35 Ths s so to the extent that lberal nsttutons are desgned, not on the On the contrary, t requres a sense of collectve partcpaton, of the sort the conservatve mght also endorse. Thus, someone wth a sense of justce, broadly understood, must be someone who agrees to constrants. Of course, some may stll reject the entre justficaton presented thus far. But my am here s not to show that lberalsm's core commtment s a vew no one could reject, but to put forward ts plausblty, ncludng ts plausblty for an external audence. The appeal of lberalsm's core commtment s that a conservatve sceptc can stll reject substantve lberal values and yet recognze, and even accept, the vrtues of lberal nsttutons. Lberalsm's core commtment, at least on Kantan constructvsm, does not ntroduce any substantve ndvdualsm. Rather than appealng to ndvdualsm, t appeals to a sense of nternal awareness, and the latter ncludes non-ndvdualstc and communty-or famly-based values. To the extent that the conservatve sceptc can reject ndvdualsm and yet wsh to pursue hs values, there are grounds for hm to recognze the merts of an nsttutonal structure that would allow hm to do just that.
VII. CONCLUSION
I tred to show n ths paper that Ka Nelsen's appeal to Rorty for an external justficaton of lberalsm faces a number of problems and that turnng to Rorty's pragmatsm s of lttle help. I have suggested that one such justficaton can be motvated from Kantan constructvsm. Although I focused mostly on the shortcomngs of Rorty's clams, there s nevertheless somethng to learn from hs pragmatsm. What emerges s that both Rawls and Rorty are strvng to find a convncng way of dscardng all thngs metaphyscal and ntroducng a useful and practcal way of thnkng about justce that s capable of makng the world a better place. The queston, then, s not so much whether phlosophers embarked on ths project are "practcal-mnded" or ant-metaphyscal, but how exactly they plan to dspense of metaphyscs and what they hope to acheve as a result. How can phlosophy be made genunely practcal, able to come to grps wth current problems, and respond to them n a way that can be used, rather than merely contemplated? What brngs Nelsen and I together s that we are also part of the same larger project. I have tred to show aganst Nelsen, however, that Rorty's pragmatsm s nsghtful only n ts broadest sense. Rawls's constructvsm, f adequately developed, may be able to provde n greater detal what t takes to "travel phlosophcally lght" (usng Nelsen's words) n the long process of tryng to figure out the requrements and delverances of justce n a complex world.
